DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES

Appendix A contains the description of the existing and potential projects, future work activities, and services associated with the five Nevada Test Site (NTS) mission programs: Defense, Waste Management, Environmental Restoration, Nondefense Research and Development, and Work for Others. A description of NTS site-support activities is provided in Section A.6. Table A-4, located at the end of this appendix, presents the resource demands and requirements of the component projects and anticipated activities of mission programs at the NTS. These data were the basis of detailed environmental analyses described in Chapter 5. The back portion of Table A-4 outlines the primary assumptions used to develop the results presented in Table A-4. The assumptions are presented by resource type, (e.g., expenditures) and by mission program for each alternative and general assumption. Projects included in each of the alternatives are described within the mission program summaries in Appendix A. Within each section, the existing and potential future projects, activities and services associated with each alternative are described. Appendix A provides information on current projects and activities, as well as information on those projects, activities and services that could occur over the next 10 years. The purpose of this appendix is to:

• Present information used to evaluate the alternatives proposed in the NTS Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
• Provide descriptions of the projects, activities, and services discussed in the main chapters of the NTS EIS.

A.1 Defense Program

Among the major responsibilities of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the NTS and the Tonopah Test Range is the continued stewardship of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. The NTS must also maintain a nuclear weapons testing capability. Other Tonopah Test Range Defense Program responsibilities are described in Section A.1.1.4.

A.1.1 Alternative 1

Under Alternative 1, Defense Program operations would continue under the ongoing nuclear test moratorium and negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Two scenarios could occur under this alternative. In one scenario, the President would not direct any nuclear yield testing, and the DOE’s nuclear-testing-related activities would be limited to maintaining readiness to conduct tests. This scenario emphasizes NTS science-based stockpile stewardship experiments and operations. The other scenario (which the DOE believes unlikely but consistent with the site’s historical mission) includes a contingent possibility that the President, through an end of the moratorium or through the "supreme national interest" clause of a test ban treaty, would direct the DOE to conduct one or more nuclear-yield tests in order to achieve a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of the weapon type in question. One or more nuclear-yield tests could be conducted as directed by the President. The activities associated with this alternative are also presented below.

A.1.1.1 Stockpile Stewardship. Stockpile stewardship includes nuclear weapons testing and science-based weapons experimentation and ensures the safety, reliability, and performance of the nation’s nuclear stockpile. The research and development of the technologies required for stockpile management are included under stockpile stewardship. The DOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) also maintains the capability of locating, retrieving, and destroying damaged nuclear weapons. Descriptions of stockpile stewardship activities addressed in the NTS EIS are provided below.

These activities are related to science-based experiments which will be conducted in emplacement holes depicted in Figure A-1.

Figure A-1. Location of stockpile stewardship emplacement holes on the NTS

A.1.1.1.1 Nuclear Test Readiness—As required by Presidential directive, the DOE will maintain the readiness and capability to conduct nuclear tests within 2 to 3 years if directed by the President. With respect to the NTS under Alternative 1, this directive means that Defense Program efforts would continue to maintain the required infrastructure and critical personnel necessary to meet this requirement. The DOE will maintain personnel skills through the conduct of dynamic experiments, (including subcritical experiments, involving special nuclear material) hydrodynamic tests, and exercises. The few capabilities essential for nuclear testing not used during the experimental program will be exercised periodically to maintain the relevant skill bases. Laboratory personnel will maintain the necessary technical competency by performing selected nuclear explosive operations at the Device Assembly Facility. These operations have been analyzed in the Device Assembly Facility Environmental Assessment. The necessary infrastructure, including facilities, will be maintained in compliance with all regulatory, safety, and programmatic requirements.

A.1.1.1.2 Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing—Since 1963, the United States has conducted all of its nuclear weapons tests underground in accordance with the terms of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Hence, complete containment of all nuclear weapons tests is a dominant consideration in nuclear test operations.

Various methods are used for emplacing nuclear test devices so that the ensuing explosion is contained. The most common method is to emplace a test device at the bottom of a vertically drilled hole. Another method is to emplace a test device within a tunnel that has been mined horizontally to a location that is sufficiently deep to provide containment.

Emplacement of a test device in a drill hole or tunnel is not accomplished until the containment design has been reviewed by the Containment Evaluation Panel. The Containment Evaluation Panel is composed of individuals who have extensive experience in nuclear testing and associated phenomenology. The Containment Evaluation Panel assists the Manager, DOE/NV, in the review of proposed nuclear tests to ensure that each containment design is one that will provide reasonable assurance of satisfactory containment of radioactivity or release radioactivity only under controlled conditions in compliance with all treaty constraints and under health and safety guidelines established by the Secretary of Energy.

Panel membership include scientists and engineers from the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, the Defense Nuclear Agency, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Desert Research Institute, and up to four independent consultants. The Panel examines each factor that might contribute to the unwanted escape of radionuclides into the atmosphere during or after the detonation. Such reviews consider in detail the device yield, depth of burial, geology, hydrology, characteristics of the soil and rock, location of the emplacement site (including the proximity to and the success of previous test locations), closure methods, stemming design, and drilling and construction history.

A detailed description of the steps associated with nuclear weapons tests in vertical drill holes is provided below.

TESTS IN VERTICAL DRILL HOLES—Tests in vertical drill holes are of two types: smaller-yield devices in relatively shallow holes in the Yucca Flat area (Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) and higher-yield devices in deeper holes on Pahute Mesa (Areas 18, 19, and 20). Tests at the Yucca Flat and Pahute Mesa event sites have the same general requirements, but differ in the magnitude of the operations. Deeper-hole operations disturb a larger area, require more on-site equipment, and have a higher requirement for electrical power and utilities. The distance from the core of the infrastructure is also a factor; Pahute Mesa operations are 48 to 81 kilometers (km) (30 to 50 miles [mi]) farther away than Yucca Flat.

The following description of a vertical drill-hole test breaks down the operation into seven individual steps:

Step1. Site Selection and Drilling. There are two subsets of site selection as it applies to nuclear tests, namely: selection of an existing drill hole for a specific event (Figure A-1), and selection of a new drill site from the Nuclear Test Zone (Figure 3-3) for a specific event because the stockpile does not contain a suitable site. The goal of siting is to optimize the various parameters so that operational feasibility and successful containment of yields of interest to device designers can be attained at a suitably low cost.

Many factors are considered. Some of these are: (1) scheduling of field resources; (2) event schedules; (3) shock sensitivity of a given experiment and possible interactions with other experiments; (4) depth range required for a suitable device emplacement; (5) geologic structure; (6) geologic material properties; (7) depth of standing water; (8) potential drilling problems; (9) adjacent expended sites, craters, chimneys, subsurface collapses; (10) adjacent open emplacement holes or unplugged post-shot or exploratory holes; and (11) non-test program constraints such as groundwater concerns, roads, and power lines (Olsen, 1993).

When drilling is required after a test location is chosen by the sponsoring national laboratory, a drilling program outlining the requirements of the specific hole is completed. The event site is surveyed, staked, and checked for cultural and biological resources. When all environmental clearances are completed, the site is graded and leveled, and a drilling-fluid sump is constructed to contain drilling fluid and cuttings. A drill rig, usually with its own power and utilities, is moved onto the site. Water is brought in by truck, or piped in, and mixed with drilling compounds to fill the sump. The hole is then drilled using standard NTS big-hole drilling techniques. A normal hole is from 1 to 3 meters (m) (48 to 120 inches [in.]) diameter and from 213 to 762 meters (m) (600 to 2,500 feet [ft]) deep. During drilling, samples of drill cuttings are collected at 3-m (10-ft) intervals, and rock cores are taken as required. After drilling is complete,geophysical logs are run into the hole to evaluate the condition of the hole and gain a more thorough understanding of the geology. The drill site is then secured by filling the sump and installing specially designed covers over the hole.

Step 2. Event-Site Engineering and Construction. When a hole is selected as a location for a nuclear test, the area around the hole is surveyed and staked according to the criteria set forth by the sponsoring national laboratory. The cultural and biological surveys are then rerun to determine if the status of the area has changed. The hole is also uncovered, and selected geophysical logs are refed in the hole to reconfirm its condition.

Once it is assured that the environmental clearances are complete, an area is cleared and leveled for the surface ground-zero equipment; another area close by the selected site is cleared and leveled for the recording trailer park. This is a typical earthmoving operation; native materials are used to top the pads or, if active material is unstable, decomposed granite fill is used. The on-site construction is temporary and is abandoned after the event is complete. Concrete pads are poured around the surface ground-zero to provide a stable platform for downhole operations and to provide a base for the assembly towers. Equipment is moved in to emplace the nuclear device in the hole, record the data produced, and provide radiological and seismic monitoring of the site. An extensive grounding system is used to establish baseline instrumentation grounds, which might include a pit containing salt water. The equipment to be left in position during the explosion is protected with an aluminum-foil hexcell-shaped shock-mounting material or dense foam. A circle of radiation detectors is placed back from the surface ground-zero to detect and assess any releases from the experiment. Finally, a perimeter fence is erected, and access is controlled both into and out of the event site.

Step 3. Device Delivery and Assembly. For safety reasons, the nuclear device is delivered to the NTS unassembled. The device is assembled and inserted into a container at the Device Assembly Facility in Area 6 or in the Area 27 Assembly/Staging Facilities. The Device Assembly Facility is discussed at the end of this section. The device, now encased in the container, is delivered to the event site accompanied by armored convoy. It is then attached to the diagnostics canister in preparation for emplacement into the hole. Checks are run, and alignment is assured. Heavy security is maintained during all operations that involve the nuclear device.

Step 4. Diagnostic Assembly. A diagnostic canister is assembled off site and transported to the test site. A typical diagnostic canister might be 2 m (8 ft) in diameter and 30 m (120 ft) long and contain all the instrumentation required to receive data at the time of the explosion (real time). The diagnostic canister might contain lead and other materials as shielding for the detectors. Upon arrival at the event site, the diagnostic canister is installed in the assembly tower to be mated with the device on site. Instrumentation cables are connected to the experiments and the recording trailer park. Slack in the cables allows the diagnostic canister to be lowered into the hole.

Step 5. Emplacement of the Experiment. The nuclear explosive and special measurement devices are moved to the hole and lowered to the detonation position; all required diagnostic materials and instrumentation cables are also lowered into the hole at this time. Downhole operations are conducted according to a defined checklist and are monitored by independent inspectors. The whole assembly is placed on a set of fracture-safe beams that span the opening. Any auxiliary equipment is then lowered into the hole, and the area is secured. Emplacement equipment is removed from the area, and test runs are conducted on the downhole experiment.

The hole is stemmed to prevent radioactive materials from escaping during or after the experiment. Stemming materials used to backfill the hole are generally placed in alternating layers, according to the containment specification. Alternate layers of 1-centimeter (cm) (3/8–in.) pea gravel are combined with fine material to provide a barrier equal to or better than the undisturbed material. Sand, gypsum, grout, cold tar, or epoxy plugs are also placed in the hole to provide impenetrable zones. In these zones, the instrument cables are sealed to prevent a radioactive gas path to the surface. Once completed, the area is cleared of unnecessary equipment. A report is compiled for the Containment Evaluation Panel to show that the as-built condition reflects the containment design plan.

Step 6. Test Execution. After the Containment Evaluation Panel accepts the as-built design of containment and all preliminary tests are successful, the nuclear device is ready for detonation. Security operations begin two days before the test to assure that all nonevent-related personnel are evacuated prior to the test for security and personal safety. The explosive is armed. Radiation monitors are activated, and aircraft with tracking capability circle the site in case gas and debris unexpectedly vent to the surface. Weather forecasts and fallout pattern predictions are reviewed. Then, detonation occurs.

When an underground nuclear device is detonated, the energy release almost instantaneously produces extremely high temperatures and pressure that vaporizes the nuclear device and the surrounding rock. Within a fraction of a second after detonation, a generally spherical cavity is formed at the emplacement position. As the hot gases cool, a lining of molten rock puddles at the cavity bottom.

After a period of minutes to hours, as the gases in the cavity cool, the pressure subsides and the weight of the overburden causes the cavity roof to collapse, producing a vertical, rubble-filled column known as a rubble chimney.

The rubble chimney commonly extends to the ground surface, forming a subsidence crater. Numerous subsidence craters are present at the test site (see Plate 7, Volume 2). Subsidence craters generally are bowl-shaped depressions with a diameter ranging from about 60 to 600 m (200 to 2,000 ft) and a depth ranging from a few meters up to 60 m (200 ft), depending on the depth of burial and the explosive energy yield. Some deeply buried explosions of low yield form cavities that do not collapse to the surface and, consequently, do not create subsidence craters. Past underground nuclear tests in Yucca Flat and on Pahute Mesa have fractured the ground surface above the explosions, causing displacement of the surface along preexisting faults adjacent to explosion sites.

After the test is conducted, the event site remains secure until it can be assured that the event has been contained. After a suitable time, a reentry crew is dispatched to the site. Data are retrieved, and the condition of equipment is noted. After all is assured to be secure, normal NTS operations resume. The event site is roped off, outlining an exclusion zone where there is danger of potential cratering.

Step 7. Post-shot Operations. After the temperature of the cavity has cooled, a post-shot hole is usually drilled into the point of the explosion in order to retrieve samples of the debris. These samples are highly radioactive, but provide important information on the test. The post-shot hole is as small in diameter as possible and is drilled at an angle to allow the drill rig to be positioned safely away from surface ground-zero. After drilling and sampling operations are complete, the drill rig and tools are decontaminated. Residual radiation is cleaned up at the site, and the hole is plugged back to the surface. This generally completes the event operation, and the site is turned back to the DOE.

A.1.1.1.3 Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship—Projects and activities associated with science-based stockpile stewardship include experiments that will provide essential data for the modeling of the performance, safety, and maintenance of the enduring stockpile. Examples of such types of projects are described below.

DEVICE ASSEMBLY FACILITY—The Device Assembly Facility is a multistructure facility in which nuclear devices and high explosives can be assembled, disassembled or modified, staged, and component tested. Nuclear devices and high-explosive activities might also include maintenance, repair, retrofit, and surveillance. This facility contains approximately 9,290 square meters (m²) (100,000 square feet [ft²]) of floor space within a 29-acre (1,263,240 ft²) high-security area. Construction is primarily of heavy steel-reinforced concrete. The facility is earth-covered with a minimum of 2 m (5 ft) of compacted earth overlay, leaving only one exterior wall.

There are individual underground structures separated by earthfill, and they are considered as separate buildings within the Device Assembly Facility. These separate buildings are connected by a common corridor. Single- and two-story sections exist within the Device Assembly Facility, with ceiling heights up to 9 m (30 ft). Second-story sections are used primarily for security forces and for additional mechanical and electrical equipment space. The entire facility is provided with an automatic fire suppression system and, in areas where a nuclear device may be present, quick-response on-off sprinkler heads are also installed.

Assembly operations at the Device Assembly Facility are carried out in the five assembly cells, three assembly bays, and four high bays. High explosives and special nuclear materials enter through the doors on the southeast side of the complex and are staged in bunkers. The materials are transferred to assembly cells where the components are assembled to the point that the device is no longer exposed. Completion of assembly includes mechanical and electrical measurements, radiography, radiation checks, alignment, and installation of other components. Radiographic operations are conducted on the component or assembly in the radiography bays and occasionally in the assembly cells or bays. In the final step, the assembly is configured for shipment to the event location.

To provide further detail of the Device Assembly Facility, the description is divided into assembly cells, assembly bays, high bays, and other facilities as follows:

Assembly Cells—The assembly cells are 10 m (34 ft) diameter work areas that include composite roofs designed to expand upward in the unlikely event of a high-explosive detonation and to collapse into the cell where the detonation occurred. The collapsed, composite roof material provides a filtration system that reduces the dispersion of aerosolized special nuclear materials by over 99.5 percent and, at the same time, absorbs the energy of an explosive blast to prevent propagation of the explosion into other structures within the facility. Decontamination facilities with tank storage are located in close proximity to the assembly cells. The assembly cells have 30 cm (12 in.) thick concrete walls and a roof structure overlain with 8 m (25 ft) of graded gravel. Each cell has an air-locked access vestibule equipped with double sets of blast doors that are interlocked so that one door must be closed before the other can be opened. The concrete structure, composite roof, and interlocking blast doors within the assembly cells reduce the potential environmental impacts that could occur during an accident and reduce exposure to workers not located in the immediate vicinity of an accident.

Assembly Bays—The assembly bays have concrete walls with separate personnel- and equipment-access air locks and interlocking blast doors to reduce potential environmental impacts and impacts to workers outside the bay. Nuclear devices containing insensitive high explosives as the only main charge explosive are assembled in assembly bays. Activities conducted in assembly bays involve the assembly of secondary components. Uncased explosives other than insensitive high explosives can be handled in these bays if no special nuclear materials are present.

High Bays—Four high bays to support test operations are similar to the assembly bays in structure and function, except that no equipment airlock is provided. Nuclear device operations conducted in assembly bays may also be conducted in high bays. Two of the four high bays allow the device transportation vehicle to be backed in for loading and unloading.

Other Facilities—Other facilities located at the Device Assembly Facility include the following:

• Bunkers are used for staging high explosives and special nuclear material components prior to assembly
• Mechanical and electrical support areas include plant mechanical systems, diesel-powered electrical generators, an uninterruptible battery power supply station, and transformers
• Administrative offices are located on the first floor of the Device Assembly Facility. Each corridor is provided with independent heating, cooling, and ventilation systems
• Radiography procedures are conducted in one of two buildings that have air-locked access corridors, blast doors, and support facilities comprised of a control room, service area, dark room, and radiography room
• Security is provided by an entry guard station that controls traffic ingress and egress to the complex. Two hardened guard towers constructed of reinforced concrete provide for exterior security and surveillance.

AREA 27 COMPLEX—The Area 27 complex is comprised of the 5100 complex (Able Site) and the 5300 complex (Baker Site). The complex has been the primary facility for the assembly of nuclear device test assemblies for the nuclear test program. In addition, the Area 27 complex is the alternate assembly facility to the Device Assembly Facility. A number of these facilities have been and will continue to be used in support of high-explosive device assembly for the Big Explosives Experimental Facility and other programmatic activities requiring the use of the Area 27 complex. These ongoing testing activities involve the use of high explosives and/or special nuclear materials separately or in combination.

Each complex consists of several buildings, storage bunkers, and other structures used for storing, staging, assembly and disassembly, handling, evaluation, and nondestructive testing of nuclear assemblies, nuclear explosive-like assemblies, high-explosive devices, critical assemblies, and special nuclear materials. Most of the facilities at each site were constructed in the 1960s for use in the nuclear test program; missions have been successfully accomplished in these facilities without any accidents involving high explosives or special nuclear materials.

The adequacy of safety of the Area 27 complex has been demonstrated over the years by a number of safety analyses, safety evaluations, hazards analysis, and nuclear devices safety studies of the dominant accidents and management controls. The management of safety has also been re-evaluated and includes reviews of safety design features, administrative controls, procedures, and documents used by the DOE/NV, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory.

In general, the complex will house kilogram (kg) quantities of special nuclear materials and up to several thousand-pound quantities of various types of high explosives. Specific reviews and evaluations are performed, as required, to establish or revise individual quantity limits for specific buildings, bunkers, and structures. Special nuclear materials limits are established based upon dispersal consequences and nuclear criticality considerations (such as form, geometry, shape, moderation, and reflection).

The primary assembly buildings (5100, 5180, and 5310) are of conventional construction, but modified in some cases for security purposes. These buildings contain assembly bays (both normal and high) for the assembly and staging of components and assemblies; restrooms; offices; lower floors for radiographic equipment; cranes and hoists for the movement of components; and resilient and conductive flooring to reduce the risk and probability of high-explosive detonation.

Security for the Able and Baker sites is provided by double security fencing, intrusion detecting, hardened guard towers, double tumbler locking systems for buildings, surveillance television, and other security systems. All exit doors are equipped with emergency (panic) hardware or safe havens that cannot be opened from the outside.

The buildings are supported by standard utilities (water and electric) and ventilation. Class II, Division 2, Group G electrical fixtures are provided in the operating bays. Certain buildings contain tritium monitoring systems with local alarms. Lightning protection is provided for all buildings. Fire protection is provided by installed sprinkler systems and wall-mounted fire extinguishers.

A.1.1.1.4 Dynamic Experiments and Hydrodynamic Tests—Dynamic experiments provide information regarding changes in materials under conditions caused by the detonation of high explosives. Dynamic experiments are conducted in order to gain information on the physical properties and dynamic behavior of materials used in high explosives and nuclear weapons, including changes caused by aging. Dynamic experiments may include the use of special nuclear material; however, those that are to be conducted are designed to remain subcritical. These experiments are called "subcritical experiments", i.e., no self-sustaining fission chain reaction will occur.

Operations at the NTS have historically included tests or experiments that, though involving both high explosives and special nuclear materials, were intended to produce no nuclear yield or negligible nuclear energy release. These tests or experiments frequently remained subcritical. They were often performed as dedicated stand-alone experiments. Nuclear explosion did not take place, therefore, the environmental impacts of these experiments were principally due to dispersal of special nuclear materials such as plutonium, and other materials, by the detonation of high explosives. These tests or experiments were performed through the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s. Some of the earlier subcritical experiments were conducted on the surface while others were conducted underground in shafts, shallow boreholes or tunnels. Future subcritical experiments would be dynamic experiments with special nuclear materials performed to answer crucial questions concerning safety and reliability of the stockpile. Approximately 10 dynamic experiments (including subcritical experiments) or hydrodynamic tests would be conducted annually at the Lyner Complex.

Hydrodynamic tests are dynamic, integrated systems tests of mock-up nuclear packages during which the high explosives are detonated and the resulting motions and reactions of materials and components are observed and measured. The explosively generated high pressures and temperatures cause some of the materials to behave hydraulically (like a fluid). Hydrodynamic tests are used to obtain diagnostic information on the behavior of a nuclear weapons primary assembly (using simulated materials for the fissile materials in an actual weapon) and to evaluate the effects of aging on the nuclear weapons remaining in the stockpile.

For the purpose of impact analysis only, it is assumed that under Alternative 1, a total of 1,100 dynamic experiments or hydrodynamic tests would be performed within the 10-year timeframe (1996 to 2005) of the NTS EIS. Examples of science-based stewardship facilities and projects are described below.

LYNER COMPLEX—Lyner was originally designed as a site to test low-yield nuclear devices. Since the moratorium on nuclear testing began, it has been converted to the testing of conventional high explosives, as well as dynamic experiments, subcritical experiments and hydrodynamic tests. The Lyner Complex consists of a mined shaft (U-1a), a drilled hole (U-1g), a connecting mined tunnel, and surface facilities located west of the Mercury Highway in Yucca Flat. The surface facilities include a trailer park for diagnostics and a work area around the mined shaft built with transportable structures.

The Lyner Complex will be used by the National Laboratories to conduct the program of dynamic experiments and hydrodynamic tests. The U-1a shaft is 293 m (961 ft) deep, with access via a man-rated hoist. Secondary access through the drilled hole at U-1g is gained by using an emergency cage powered by a separate hoist. The U-1g drill hole also provides access for the firing and diagnostic cables. The cables and other utilities are grouted into the annulus of the 122-cm (48-in.) access casing and the 274-cm (108-in.) diameter hole. An independent ventilation system at the U-1g drill hole provides a second supply of downhole air, thus supplementing the U-1a supply and acting as a dual system in the case of an accident.

The connecting main drift is mined 335 m (1,100 ft) due north to the U-1g drill hole from the U-1a shaft. Tunnel support is provided by rock bolts, wire mesh, and shotcrete. Secondary containment for experiments is located in the main drift, along with distribution of utilities. Secondary containment assures a safe condition in the event of failure of the primary containment in the side drifts. Primary containment is provided by closing the side drifts with grouts and steel containment doors. Secondary containment is achieved by massive grout plugs keyed to the rock with gas-tight steel doors within the plugs.

Explosive events are placed in side drifts mined perpendicular to the main drift. Multiple tests could be fielded by the complex without changes to the main drift. The experiment drifts would be mined to suit the requirements of the experiment assigned. One experimental drift has been completed and successfully expended for the demonstration experiment.

Site development includes a 3-acre recording trailer park by the U-1g hole and a 17-acre pad that contains the construction support buildings at the U-1a shaft location. Downhole support equipment includes data gathering, emergency refuge chambers, distribution conduits for air and utilities, and a freight and passenger landing at the hoist. Electrical power and water are supplied from the NTS. The Lyner site is connected to the control point by a fiber-optic cable link. An emergency evacuation system is installed with self-contained power and a dedicated hoist mechanism at the U-1g hole. The U-1g hole provides emergency access to the complex and a backup access should an accident close the U-1a shaft.

Further details regarding activities conducted in the Lyner Complex are addressed in a classified appendix to the NTS EIS. However, environmental impacts of activities conducted at the Lyner Complex are included in the analysis in Chapter 5 of the NTS EIS.

BIG EXPLOSIVES EXPERIMENTAL FACILITY— The Big Explosives Experimental Facility is located in north-central Area 4. The site contains seven underground structures previously associated with atmospheric testing, one set of unidentified stanchions that might have been associated with atmospheric testing, the Bare Reactor Experiment Nevada Tower foundations and stanchions and the Japanese Village complex, the U-4ad drill hole and drill sump, the U-4af exclusion zone, and a white silicified volcanic core reduction flake. These structures were abandoned when nuclear testing went underground. Two of the buried structures, bunkers 4-300 and 4-480, have been modified to accommodate modern hydrodiagnostic equipment to serve as a hydrodynamic test facility for detonations of very large conventional high-explosive charges and devices. The electrical,lighting, and ventilation systems of the bunkers have been replaced or upgraded, optical ports and electronic control conduits have been added, the area surrounding the bunkers has been graded, and earthen berms have been added to improve blast protection, shield from X-radiation, and provide a downrange projectile stop. The intent of the modifications was to provide all of the sophisticated diagnostics capability of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Site 300 Hydrotesting Facility for experiments containing more than the currently available 277-kilogram (kg) (500-pound [lb]) high-explosive weight limit.

Bunker 4-480 was modified to house up to five nitrogen or helium gas-driven rotating-mirror framing cameras, laser-illuminated image-converter cameras, continuous-rotating-mirror framing cameras, rotating-mirror streaking cameras, and/or infrared imaging cameras in various combinations. It is equipped with 5 camera stands and 5 corresponding optical ports with access to the 20 m x 20 m (66 ft x 66 ft) area gravel firing pad.

Bunker 4-300 contains three rooms: the control room, the laser room, and the utility room. The control and utility rooms were modified to house the diagnostic and firing control electronics, digitizers, electronic recording equipment, and other electronic equipment necessary for hydrodynamic tests. The laser room was modified to accommodate a pulsed Ruby laser for image-converter camera illumination and a neodymium laser for multibeam Fabry-Perot velocimetry, as well as the Fabry-Perot analyzer table.

Three large (3m [10 ft] diameter and 6m [20 ft] long) steel cylinders were placed outside the bunkers near the firing pad to house 2.3-MeV Febetron flash X-ray sources for high-energy X-ray radiography. Hycam recorders and video monitors were also placed around the firing area to monitor the aboveground activity and experimental performance of the test devices.

The structural soundness of the modified bunkers for expanded operations and the potential environmental impacts of blast, noise, and dust uplift due to hydrodynamic tests were investigated in the five experiments of the Popover test series conducted between March 1995 and August 1995. The tests consisted of detonations of successively larger amounts of spherical charges of conventional trinitrotoluene explosive beginning at 232 kg (512 lb) and ending with 3,538 kg (7,800 lb). The noise, acceleration, strain, overpressure, dust uplift, and area contamination were monitored in order to validate predictive models of shock, blast, noise, and gas product dispersion and to certify the safety of the manned operation of Bunker 4-300 during hydrodynamic tests. The bunkers were found to meet all required safety criteria, and a committee of senior scientists and engineers was chartered to evaluate the test results and recommended the facility for expanded operations.

The high-explosive weight limit for safe, manned operations at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility is based on the following facility design criteria: 454 kg (1,000 lb) of conventional high explosives detonated 5 m (15 ft) from the Bunker 4-480 outer wall or 2,268 kg (5,000 lb) of conventional high explosives detonated 8.3 m (27 ft) from the Bunker 4-480 outer wall. Based on the results of the Popover test series, the relationship between conventional high-explosive charge mass and safe detonation distance was determined to conform to these two criteria. For experiments involving larger or smaller charge masses than previously tested or involving charge configurations different from those previously tested, the safe operating distance(s) of the charge(s) will be determined using these criteria and standard engineering practice. In this way, arbitrarily large conventional high-explosive charge masses in practically any configuration can be safely detonated as long as the equivalent impact of the detonation on the facility in terms of overpressure, blast, shock, and noise is less than or equal to the facility design criteria.

Under this alternative approximately 100 hydrodynamic tests or dynamic experiments would be conducted annually at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. No experiment performed at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility will contain special nuclear materials. A synopsis of current Big Explosives Experimental Facility projects and activities follows.

Shaped Charge Scaling Project— The purpose is to develop and test large shaped-charge technology, originated within the DOE weapons laboratories, for broad counterproliferation applications. The project includes scaling the existing technology to larger sizes; developing, testing, modifying, and characterizing the performance of the large charges; and applying the scaled shaped-charges to a variety of counterproliferation missions to test effectiveness against various targets. Typical experiments involve up to 3,600 kg (8,000 lb) or more of conventional high explosives in a variety of configurations.

Other High-Explosive Experiments—This includes potential projects with the goal of developing, improving testing and deploying advances in conventional munitions technology or their applications. Examples include the development of advanced conventional weapons, including shaped charges, explosively formed projectiles, propellant-driven devices, explosive munitions, pyrotechnics and other conventional weapons technologies, applications of these technologies to hard target and/or buried structure defeat, counterproliferation, and armor defeat. Typical experiments involve 3,600 kg (8,000 lb) or more of conventional high explosives in a variety of configurations.

A.1.1.2 Stockpile Management. Under Alternative 1, no stockpile management activities would be conducted at the NTS.

A.1.1.3 Nuclear Emergency Response. The DOE/NV Emergency Management Program is administered by the DOE/NV Emergency Management and Nonproliferation Division. The program receives significant support from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Environmental Monitoring and Support Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) explosive ordnance demolition experts, and the DOE/NV contractors. The program is comprised of a number of separate, but related, emergency response programs, including the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Aerial Measuring System, the Accident Response Group, the Radiological Assistance Program, and the DOE/NV Internal Emergency Management Program. Program activities are based at facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada; Santa Barbara, California; Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, DC; and the NTS. These activities are individually summarized below.

A.1.1.3.1 Nuclear Emergency Search Team— DOE Order 5530.2, issued September 20, 1991, requires the Manager, DOE/NV, to maintain an operational team of specialists and equipment for response to threats involving nuclear explosives, illegal use of nuclear materials, and weapons of mass destruction. The Nuclear Emergency Search Team, comprised of members from the DOE, other federal agencies, the nuclear weapon design laboratories, and the DOE/NV contractors, is prepared to provide technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, designated by law as the lead agency for response to terrorist acts in the United States. Since 1975, when the team was formed, significant research efforts, extensive exercises, and the DOE participation in responses to large nuclear emergencies, including the reentry of the Russian Cosmos 954 nuclear-powered satellite and the Three-Mile Island reactor accident, have contributed substantially to the development of needed response capabilities.

A.1.1.3.2 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center—The DOE has been tasked to develop and maintain the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center program. The DOE establishes and manages the field operations center when a major radiological emergency occurs or potentially may occur. The creation of a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center capability is mandated by the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan and is assigned to the DOE/NV by the DOE Headquarters. DOE Order 5530.5, published in July 1992, specifies the purpose, organization, and responsibilities associated with the establishment of a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center.

The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center is responsible for acquiring, processing, and providing assessment of radiological data in the field. The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center may be called on to support or provide follow-on support to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team. The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center is a stand-alone organization capable of responding to any type of nuclear emergency, including nuclear weapons, transportation, or power-plant-related accidents.

A.1.1.3.3 Aerial Measuring System—The Aerial Measuring System mission is documented in DOE Order 5530.4, which defines its purpose and describes its roles and responsibilities. Primary objectives of the Aerial Measuring System are to:

• Conduct aerial surveys of the DOE facilities on a periodic basis to detect changes in conditions
• Develop remote sensing, analytical, and display technology for detection of nuclear radiation, as well as spectral characteristics in the ultraviolet, optical, and infrared spectra emitted from an environment that provides information about its condition or status
• Establish and maintain a technically competent emergency response capability, including the administrative, logistical, and technical support required in situations involving radiation, radioactive materials, or other hazardous materials.

The resources of the Aerial Measuring System are on call 24 hours a day for emergency operations.

A.1.1.3.4 Accident Response Group—The Accident Response Group, which is managed by the DOE/Albuquerque Operations Office, has a mission similar to the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, but focuses on accidents involving United States’ nuclear weapons. The Accident Response Group deals with on-site conditions while the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center addresses off-site measurements and assessments.

The DOE/NV, through a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOE/Albuquerque Operations Office, provides field response resources to the Albuquerque Office Accident Response Group team in support of nuclear weapons accidents, exercises, and training. The Accident Response Group is mandated by DOE Order 5530.1A, issued on September 20, 1991. It defines the purpose of the program and clarifies the responsibilities and authorities of the DOE Headquarters and the Operations Offices. The Accident Response Group resources required are normally drawn from the DOE/NV Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Aerial Measuring System programs. An Accident Response Group mission may require any of the DOE/NV major emergency management resources.

Some support requirements for this program are similar to the DOE/NV Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Aerial Measuring System programs. The use of Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Aerial Measuring System personnel, expertise, and equipment to support the Accident Response Group program eliminates the cost of duplicate services.

A.1.1.3.5 Radiological Assistance Program—The Radiological Assistance Program is prepared to furnish assistance in all types of radiological incidents. The program is mandated by DOE Order 5530.1A. Response to radiological incidents may include on- and off-site assistance when requested by other federal agencies or state, local, and tribal authorities in dealing with radiological incidents.

The DOE/NV Radiological Assistance Program provides two teams, a Radiological Assistance Team and a Radiological Cleanup Team, that can respond to radiological incidents. The Radiological Assistance Team acts to control and confine hazards resulting from incidents involving radioactive material that may pose a threat to public health and safety. The Radiological Cleanup Team may provide services for radioactive material cleanup in the event of an incident involving such materials.

A.1.1.3.6 Internal Emergency Management Program—The purpose of the Internal Emergency Management Program is to ensure capabilities exist to respond to on-site emergencies. These emergencies include unusual occurrences, such as fire, bombs or bomb threats, earthquakes, aircraft accidents, and power outages. Specific plans have been established to respond to the emergencies delineated in the current hazards assessment. The primary goals of these plans are to maximize the safety of personnel, minimize equipment and facility damage, and minimize facility downtime in the event of a major accident or emergency.

A.1.1.4 Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material. There is no activity under Alternative 1.

A.1.1.5 Large, Heavy-Industrial Facility. There is no activity under Alternative 1.

A.1.1.6 Tonopah Test Range Activities. The principal mission of the Tonopah Test Range is to provide research and development test support for the DOE-funded weapons projects. Many tests performed at the Tonopah Test Range involve aircraft and air drops; the range is capable of handling a wide variety of missions. Tests conducted vary from simple tests of hardware components and systems needing only limited support to rocket launches and air drops of test vehicles requiring full range support. A structural test of nuclear systems sometimes involves special nuclear material; however, all tests are performed on non-destructive yield assemblies only. No nuclear yield testing is conducted on the Tonopah Test Range. The principal types of tests include impact tests, passive tests, and chemical tests.

An impact testing program has been developed to test various parameters of the weapon while in flight or dropping a weapon and through the actual penetration of the ground surface. The data obtained assist in weapons development, as well as the maintenance of the nation’s weapons stockpile. The weapons include conventional, nuclear, and inert projectiles. The weapons are unarmed and, for nuclear munitions, a portion of the nuclear package has been omitted. The nuclear weapons are, therefore, unable to reach criticality. Impact tests include the following:

• Air Drop Operations
• Fixed Rocket Launcher Operations
• Artillery Operations
• Cruise Missile Operations
• Compressed Air Gun (Davis Gun)
• Seismic Verifications
• Fuel Air Explosives Operations
• Hazardous Burn Test Operations
• Underground Explosives
• Open-Air Explosives
• Post-Test Procedures and Recovery

The chemical testing program involves the testing of chemical effects on stockpile weapons. The physical properties (i.e., explosive/combustible) of chemicals are tested for applicability and use in the nation’s weapons stockpile. Other portions of the program test for defenses against possible hostile nations chemical warfare arsenals. Chemical tests would include testing of the following:

• Liquids (burn, explosive)
• Gas (burn, explosive)
• Particle (graphite, smoke).

The passive testing program uses high-resonance energy, lasers, and ultrasound techniques for checking the systems of the nation’s conventional and nuclear weapons stockpile. Tests are also conducted on behalf of nonproliferation research to determine if other countries are using or developing nuclear capabilities. These tests would include the following:

• Telemetry, Microwave, and Photometrics Operations
• Radar Operations
• Laser Tracker
• Radiographic Operations
• Electromagnetic Radiation Test.

A.1.2 Alternative 2

No Defense Program activities would occur at the NTS under Alternative 2. DOE, Albuquerque mission related Defense Program activities at the Tonopah Test Range would be the same as those described under Alternative 1.

A.1.3 Alternative 3

Under this alternative, all NTS Defense Program activities described under Alternative 1 would continue. Many new activities would also be included under Alternative 3.

A.1.3.1 Stockpile Stewardship. Activities are essentially the same as those described under Alternative 1. However, hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would be expanded to include larger high-explosive charges and potentially hazardous materials. These tests are described below in Section A.1.3.1.3.The requirements of a science-based stockpile stewardship require the design and construction of large, new pulsed-power and accelerator based simulation machines. Examples of such machines include the National Ignition Facility, the Advanced Radiation Source, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility, and the Advanced Hydrotest Facility. All these machines share a support infrastructure. Thus, a national test and demonstration center, based on the capabilities of these machines, is a future use of the NTS. Activities performed would be based on the capabilities of these devices, including such diverse activities as fusion research, effects testing, accelerator and pulsed power component testing and development, transmutation of elements, and basic physics research.

A.1.3.1.1 Nuclear Test Readiness—Activities would be the same as those described under Alternative 1.

A.1.3.1.2 Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing—Activities would be the same as those described under Alternative 1.

A.1.3.1.3 Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship— Under Alternative 3, the total number of dynamic experiments including subcritical experiments, and hydrodynamic tests conducted at the NTS would be the same as those identified under Alternative 1 (1,100 during the 10-year period). However, dynamic experiments and hydrodynamic tests at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would be expanded to include larger high-explosive charges and potentially hazardous materials, such as beryllium, depleted uranium, deuterium, and tritium. Additional information on potentially hazardous materials associated with dynamic experiments and hydrodynamic tests is provided in Appendix F and classified Appendix J. Examples of experiments to be conducted at Big Explosives Experimental Facility include:

SHAPED-CHARGE SCALING PROJECT—The purpose is to develop large shaped-charge technology, originated within the DOE weapons laboratories, for broad counterproliferation applications. The project includes scaling the existing technology to larger sizes; developing, testing, modifying, and characterizing the performance of the large charges; and applying the scaled shaped-charges to a variety of counterproliferation missions to test effectiveness against various targets. Under Alternative 3, typical proposed experiments would involve up to 32,000 kg (70,000 lb) of conventional high explosives in a variety of configurations and the use of beryllium, depleted uranium, deuterium, and tritium.

OTHER HIGH-EXPLOSIVE EXPERIMENTS— In addition to activities in Alternative 1, high-explosive experiments in Alternative 3 would include the use of novel methods to initiate detonation of several elements and/or pieces and/or points of conventional high explosives with a high degree of simultaneity. Under Alternative 3, typical proposed experiments would involve 9,072 kg (20,000 lb) or more of conventional high explosives in a variety of configurations.

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Last Updated November 01, 1999
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